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Abstract 
Africa is rife with sectional discontents which metamorphose into protracted conflicts, civil wars, and 
terrorism. With forlorn hopes of survival in the system and without a say in the constitution building 
process, disgruntled groups easily cloak their political and socio-economic dissatisfaction with ethnicity, 
religious or similar identities in order to arouse group affection. At present, Nigeria is at the brink of 
disintegration as a result of this problem. The country has witnessed about six constitutional 
arrangements since independence. Yet, the clamour for a new constitution remains constant and, 
invariably, influenced the convening of the 2014 National Constitutional Conference in the country. Since 
constitution building provides a good opportunity for the citizens and groups to enshrine their wishes in 
the instrument of governance and thereby preventing the degeneration of grievances into conflict, 
questions have continued to arise. Does the constitution making process in Nigeria involve the people 
for whom the laws are meant for? Are the leaders mindful of the peace potentials of constitution 
building? This paper seeks to ascertain the extent to which the citizens were involved in the making of 
the previous constitutions in Nigeria. It projects the view that the failures of the past attempts and the 
prevalent identity conflicts in Nigeria are attributable to non-adherence to the basic principles of the 
indispensable people-oriented process of constitution building. 
Keywords: Constitution, Constitution-Building, Identity Conflicts, Africa, Nigeria. 
Introduction1.
The attainment of an acceptable and durable constitution by most African countries remains a 
herculean task and such a gory situation contributes greatly towards the heightening of sectional 
insurrections. The situation has continued to greatly worsen the level of development and security 
in the continent. It is common for the political elites to dominate the entire political landscape and 
control the policy making structures in such ways that favour particular sections of their respective 
countries, apart from sustaining their usual sit-tight bids. The trend manifests vividly in the 
constitution-building processes. In Nigeria, the history of constitution making has witnessed several 
disorderly phases and processes, and is inseparable with the tortuous political history of the 
country. Nigeria, as it is today, remains a British colonial concoction which resulted from the 1914 
amalgamation of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Northern 
Nigeria. Since then, the country has gone through several daunting political transformative phases. 
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More interestingly, and as if to rationalize the claim and activities of the successive claimants to 
power, each of the phases seems to have influenced the process and nature of the 
contemporaneous constitutions. 
The first phase (from about 1914 to 1946) was a period of complete subordination, when the 
British government and its local officials completely held sway. This period witnessed the 1914, 
1922 and 1946 constitutional arrangements. The second phase (1946 to independence) was 
marked by the opening of a little vent through which Nigerians gradually began to be involved in 
governance activities and it culminated in the attainment of independence. The period produced the 
1951, 1954 and 1960 constitutions. The next phase (1960 to 1966) was the era of the First 
Republic which produced the 1963 Republican Constitution. The last phase (1966 to 1999) was 
predominantly marked by military absolutism. The 1979 and 1999 Constitutions were products of 
this phase and were designed in a way that suggests attempts at perpetuation of the military in the 
governance of the country. From the foregoing, it is obvious that since its inauguration, the Nigerian 
nation has had nine written constitutions. When compared with some of the countries that Nigeria’s 
political leaders have been struggling to mimic, like the United States of America, this is not a mean 
record, though on the negative track. The more disturbing aspect of the situation is that throughout 
the country, from north to south and from east to west, calls for a new constitution and a better 
constitutional development process have continued to reverberate, as in the past. As the 
International IDEA (2001, p.12) observed, 
 
Expressed in different forms and with different mutations and areas of emphasis, one thing 
became clear. Nigerians want an inclusive, consultative and participatory process in which the 
composite parts of the whole, called Nigeria, can be examined as equals and partners in the 
process of nation-building and continued existence. 
 
A closer look at the origin and activities of the ethnic militias and the various identity conflicts 
in Nigeria reveals the role of bottled up grievances as a result of many years of deprivations and 
marginalization (Mbah and Nwangwu, 2014, 683). Today, the activities of groups like the Boko 
Haram religious sect and ethnic militias such as the OPC, MASSOB, IPOB and the numerous Niger 
Delta militants have not only heightened the level of mutual distrust and insecurity but have also 
been threatening the continued existence of the country. Whichever way one looks at the situation 
from, whether their grievances and demands are based on real or perceived deprivations and fears, 
some of the common denominators among these groups include the accusation of inadequate 
consultation and representation at the policy-making levels of governance as well as imposed 
constitutions whose provisions are skewed to deprive them of their rights both as humans and 
citizens of the country. 
 
1.1 Research Questions and Method 
 
From the foregoing, certain salient probes could be evoked. Could it be that those who are 
fortunate to be part of the leadership of the country and, by extension, the formulation of the 
constitutions are ignorant of the virtues of constitution-building or the indispensability of its people-
oriented process? Is it not a historical fact that the previous constitutional ‘experiments’, from the 
colonial period, failed mainly because the people for whom the constitutions were meant to serve 
were not adequately carried along during the formulation stages? Without losing sight of the other 
hindrances, it is the position of this paper that until this missing link is taken care of, the attainment 
of an acceptable and durable constitution will largely remain elusive? It seeks to prove this by 
looking at the concepts of constitution-building and constitution-making and to probe the previous 
constitutional arrangements in order to identify the missing links and with a view to substantiating 
the perception that proper adherence to the precepts of constitution-building would greatly assist in 
removing the steam from the embers of the cancerous scourge of identity conflicts in Nigeria and 
Africa generally. Using the historical descriptive method, what follows is a critical analysis of 
relevant data obtained from archival documents, books, journal articles and periodicals. 
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 Conceptual Clarifications 2.
 
2.1 Constitution 
 
Simply put, the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Contemporary English defines a 
constitution as a “System of government; laws and principles according to which a state is 
governed”. It has also been variously defined as “a supreme law of the land promulgated to 
exercise sovereignty” (HPCR International, 2007-2008) and as “a set or body of principles and rules 
determining the structure, powers and limitations of the government of the country as well as 
defining the rights and duties of the governed” (Ndoh, 1997, p.1).  But beyond being a set of rules 
and laws regulating a society and government, or a mere social contract, a constitution should be 
an “expression of the general will of a nation, the reflection of its history, fears, concerns, 
aspirations, visions and, indeed, the soul of the nation” (International IDEA, 2001, pp.142-3). It is 
logical, therefore, to state that in a heterogeneous society like Nigeria, a constitution must capture 
the views of the majority without losing sight of the concerns of the minority and even the 
ideologically opposed groups before it can be seen as a single document ‘owned’ by the citizens. 
To achieve this, the active participation of the citizens in the making of the constitution and, more 
importantly, their consent to its provisions must not be usurped or spurious. 
 
2.2 Constitution-Making 
 
On its part, "constitution-making or constitutional engineering refers to the technical act of rendering 
a constitution” or, differently put, “the technical process of the drawing up or amending a 
constitution” (HPCR International, 2007-2008). It involves the process of mapping out and adoption 
of a suitable design which includes “the institutions for the making of decisions and the method of 
making decisions” (Ghai and Galli, 2006, p.9). In constitution-making, the importance of wide 
participation and deliberation cannot be over-emphasized, as the legitimacy of the end product – 
the constitution – largely depends on such attributes. In a democratic environment, for instance, "a 
well-designed process can in itself be an education in and for the deliberative and participatory 
politics that the constitution may call for” (Ghai and Galli, 2006, p.10). In other words, for a 
constitution to capture the wishes of the people or the ‘soul’ of the nation, its ‘making’, amendment 
and review must entail the creative engagement of academics, non-governmental organizations, 
the media, trade unions, youth groups and other mass organizations. This procedure centres on 
popular participation, national dialogue, transparency, widespread education and mobilization as 
well as the involvement of the people, their constituencies and communities at all levels of the 
constitution making process, all geared towards the re-structuring of the state. As well, the process 
must not be restricted to the urban-based elites or organizations. 
 The legitimacy of the process of its adoption determines the extent to which it is accepted and 
ratified by the citizens. It is doubtful that a constitution that has not been tested against the will of 
the people can reflect that will. The argument here is that if the people are involved in the making of 
the constitution, they can easily possess, pre-empt, defend and re-define or easily review it against 
attempts to subvert it. In other words, the quality of a constitution is neither determined by the 
sweetness of its provisions nor by the extent to which it is ‘cloned’ from what exists in the most 
developed countries of the world or from utopianism but by the extent to which it conforms with the 
wishes of the citizens at a particular period of time. In Nigeria, unfortunately, instead of this 
process-led and people-oriented ‘bottom-up’ approach to constitution making which conforms with 
modern political trends, the tradition has been a situation where the political elites, especially the 
urban-based ones, in the discredited ‘top-down’ manner, negotiate and, as Hart (2003, p.5) would 
say, “draft texts behind closed doors” and impose their decisions on the majority of the citizens 
without minding the conflict-carrying capacity of such undemocratic traditions. 
 
2.3 Constitution-Building 
 
According to Ghai and Galli (2006, p.9), constitution-building “refers to the process whereby a 
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political entity commits itself to the establishment and observance of a system of values and 
government”. It is a rigorous process through which the state ensures that the constitution evolves 
strictly from a particular 'environment' and its citizens, both individually and collectively, at any point 
in time. Apart from involving longer or evolutionary processes, constitution-building requires 
painstaking interaction between the sovereign state and its representative/s on the one side and the 
citizens on the other. As a broader and lengthier notion of constitution-making, it has proved to be a 
crucial aspect of peacebuilding.  It provides a solid basement for constitutionalism, trust in the state, 
and peaceful interaction among the constituent sections of the state and, by so doing, remains a 
missing link in the resolution of the numerous ongoing identity conflicts in the Nigeria and Africa 
generally. 
With regard to its attributes, constitution-building involves a continuous process of socio-
cultural and political socialization and interest articulation and aggregation which are woven into the 
national psyche through reviews and amendments of the constitution as the need arises. Its 
practice stretches over a long period of time and even as long as the state exists. The constitution 
of the United States of America comes to mind here. Inaugurated during the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century, the constitution has continued to exist and retain the approval of the different 
sections and classes of the citizens. According to Ghai and Galli (2006, p.9), 
 
Constitution-building in this sense is almost an evolutionary process of nurturing the text and 
facilitating the unfolding of its logic and dynamics. So, for example, a text whose birth is in some 
respects inauspicious, even contested, can in time stamp its imprint on society and weave its way 
into public favour, while a constitution proclaimed with great enthusiasm can run into difficulties, 
be ignored or even discarded. 
 
In Nigeria, for instance, the quota system that goes with the Federal Character principle was 
enshrined in the constitution in order to give a sense of belonging to the different ethnic and identity 
groups. At present, however, it is obvious that the inherent advantages are being greatly dwindled 
by its contradictory, divisive, and pro-mediocrity tendencies. Gaventa (2002, p.9) observed that, 
 
Whereas the national Constitution under the new democracy in Nigeria proclaims that ‘every 
citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations, and opportunities before the law’, in fact such 
rights are mediated through other forms of identity, which may often be exclusionary and 
competing. People who ‘belong’ with one identity, whether based on location, religion, gender or 
ethnicity, are considered ‘foreigners’ with another. 
 
This remains one of the sore points that keep fueling the heightening of identity conflicts 
among the constituent ethnic groups in the country. 
Secondly, it is people-oriented and adopts a ‘bottom-up’ approach that translates to the 
conferment of a state’s sovereign powers on the people. Unlike the old practice that tend to place 
the crafting of the constitution in the hands of few elites and, sometimes, under utmost secrecy, “the 
accepted paradigm is to increase the deliberative and participatory nature of constitution-building” 
so that the constitution will “represent the sovereign will of the population at large, as well as the 
nuanced needs of those ‘nations’ that continue to live within the same state.” (HPCR International, 
2007-2008). As the 'Preamble' of almost every constitution portrays, "if sovereignty is indeed vested 
in and flows from the people (an implication also of the principle of self-determination), it is natural 
that they should determine how it should be delegated and exercised” (Ghai and Galli, 2006, p.13).  
Generally, constitution-building promotes "a sense of common belonging and destiny critical 
for national unity" and territorial integrity (Ghai and Galli, 2006, p.10), even in multi-ethnic entities. It 
does this mainly by enhancing the ability of a political community to develop a national ideology and 
negotiated collective agenda for social and political change. The multi-ethnic composition of Nigeria 
and the attendant diverse identity-based interests have continued to play debilitating roles with 
regard to consensus building among the major ethnic groups. Unfortunately, the long period of 
military dictatorship in Nigeria stifled the budding pro-independence constitution-building culture in 
the country and replaced same with biased elitist constitutional impositions that tend to encourage 
identity rivalries and conflicts. 
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 The Previous Constitution-building Aberrations in Nigeria 3.
 
In the absence of a constitution-building culture, most of the constitutions operated in Nigeria, from 
the colonial period to the present, were not people and process-oriented and their rejection or 
unpopularity stemmed mainly from this problem. The result was the rejection and protests that 
trailed each of the constitutional arrangements. What follows in this section is an attempt to 
highlight some of the preceding agitations and fallouts of the previous constitutions in order to 
elucidate the obviousness of constitution-building aberrations in the Nigerian system. 
 
3.1 The Constitutional Arrangement of 1914 
 
This was the first attempt at constitutional development in Nigeria. Strictly speaking, this may not be 
regarded as a constitution but an administrative arrangement put in place by Lord Lugard after the 
1914 Amalgamation. The constitutional arrangement proved to be a failure from inception mainly 
because the very people whom it was meant to serve were neither consulted nor adequately taken 
care of. Similarly, no attempt was made to educate the indigenous people, especially the Chiefs, on 
the precepts of the political system which would have augured well for the articulation and 
aggregation of the interests of the governed which, in turn, would have formed a solid foundation for 
an enduring constitution–building culture in the country. Even though the Nigerian Council was 
intended as a further means of securing the expression of public opinion from every part of the 
newly amalgamated colonial territory, it was highly ineffective in this regard. It was stated, ab initio, 
that “no resolution passed by the Council shall have any legislative or executive authority, and the 
Governor shall not be required to give effect to any such resolution unless he thinks fit and is 
authorized to do so” (Nigerian Order-in-Council, 1913, p.241). The abolition of the Council in 
February 1923 was not, therefore, surprising or regretted by Nigerians. 
 
3.2 The Clifford’s Constitution of 1922 
 
Sir Hugh Clifford who replaced Lord Lugard in 1919 was forced to replace his predecessor’s 
constitution because of the inherent flaws. His decision to this effect was greatly influenced by the 
activities of the educated Africans especially under the auspices of the National Congress of British 
West Africa (NCBWA). Certainly, the constitution made landmark contributions, such as the elective 
principle, towards the political development of the country. However, it only scratched the demands 
of the nationalists for greater participation, repeal of obnoxious ordinances and the overall 
development of the colonial territories on the surface (Crowder and Abdullahi, 1979, p.176-8). As 
observed by Olusanya (1980, p.523), such demands were described by the colonial authorities as, 
“loose and gaseous talk emanating from a group of self-appointed, self-selected educated 
gentlemen who collectively" claimed to be the representatives of the people, and that conceding 
their demands would be “incompatible with the natural development of real national self-
government which all patriots in Nigeria should combine to secure and maintain." But, having 
realized the inappropriateness of a small fraction of the people to adequately represent the whole 
without prior consultations and the indispensability of an all-involving process in the building of a 
constitution, one would have expected the colonial authorities to properly sensitize and aggregate 
the wishes of the majority of the people in order to increase the acceptability of the constitution. 
This was not done either. 
 
3.3 The Richards’ Constitution of 1946 
 
The 1946 Richards’ Constitution revealed an important lesson on the imperative of the people and 
process-oriented attribute of constitution-building: regardless of the inherent good intentions of a 
constitution, it is bound to fail if it is imposed on the people or bereft of the sustainable constitution-
building ideology and structures. A closer examination reveals that some of the provisions of the 
1946 constitution emanated from genuine intention on the part of the colonial authorities to sustain 
the unity of the country. The colonial authorities felt the need to recognize the socio-cultural and 
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political administrative differences between the northerners and southerners which made it 
expedient for each of the three regions to be assisted to develop at its own rate without necessarily 
pulling out of or dismembering the entity. On the irritation caused by lack of proper consultation of 
Nigerians, Governor Richards explained “that the proposals had to be hurried through the Council 
to enable the British Parliament to discuss and pass it before its dissolution for the General Election 
of that year" (Olusanya, p.526). To an extent, the projected rationale for the three regional 
structures sounds convincing. But same cannot be said about the other criticisms like non-
increment in the number of the elected members of the legislative council, the restriction of the 
elective principle to Lagos and Calabar, and especially the problem of lack of consultations and 
debate of the proposal by the people for whom the constitution was meant for. 
Besides, the period between 1944 and 1946 was long enough for the proper consultation of 
Nigerians by the new governor. Such consultations would have afforded Nigerians the opportunity 
to make their inputs and reach possible agreements with the colonial officials which would have 
reduced the attendant frictions. Governor Richards’ predecessor in office, Sir Bernard Bourdillon 
(1946, p.80, cited in Olusanya, 1980, p.525-526) is said to have condemned the lapse on the 
grounds that a constitution "must not be ‘a fossil, excavated from some museum and polished up 
for the occasion’” but "must be a living organism, capable of growth and adaptation to new 
circumstances," and which can only be achieved "if the people whom it concerns have a 
considerable say in its formation, and if it is suited to the soil in which it is intended to grow." 
Equally, many Nigerians saw the imposition as a calculated attempt to extend the despised British 
colonial ‘divide and rule’ strategy (Nnoli, 1980, p.112; Coleman, 1986, p.295; Akinola, 1988, p.442). 
Again, as observed by Kalu Ezera (1960, p.76-84), whatever positive impact the constitution 
made by integrating the Northern and Southern Nigeria in one legislative council was shattered by 
the concept of regionalism which ignited the process of fragmentation of the country. With regard to 
adequate representation in governance, Nwabueze (1982, p.44) still recognized the constitution as 
"a semi-representative one” due to the fact that not up to half of the members were to be elected by 
Nigerians. Moreover, the Richards’ Constitution was accused of having laid the foundation of the 
marginalization of the minority tribes in Nigeria who were swallowed up by the three major ethnic 
groups under the three regional structure. 
 
3.4 Macpherson's Constitution of 1951 
 
The 1951 Constitution provided a different crucial constitution-building lesson for the constitutional 
development of Nigeria - the problem of inadequate political socialization and interest aggregation 
which would have imbued the people with patriotic considerations and also harmonized the 
contending complex interests. In view of the shortcomings of the Richards’ Constitution and the 
total condemnation that trailed it, the new Governor-General, Sir John Macpherson had set up a 
Select Committee of the Legislative Council in March 1949 which organized regional conferences at 
Ibadan, Enugu and Kaduna and eventually an All-Nigeria Constitutional Conference at Ibadan in 
1950.  As has been rightly observed, “this was the first time Nigerians had been called upon to work 
out their own constitution and so the new constitution provided them with the necessary training in 
the art of constitution-making” (Olusanya, 1980, p.533). The three regions agreed on a federal 
system with slight modifications, among other decisions. However, the conference revealed the gap 
in constitutional development and level of disunity existing between the North and South and which 
remains the bane of Nigeria’s unity. For instance, the North insisted on having half of the seats in 
the House of Representatives on population grounds, and for revenue from taxation to be allocated 
on per capita basis. Again, whereas the East and West wanted a cabinet government, the North 
opposed it. Similarly, while the North and West desired the Electoral College system and creation of 
House of Chiefs, the East opposed them. 
The same ethnic sentiments and schism also marred discussions on the choice of federalism 
and possible structures. The situation was only saved by the resolve of both the East and West to 
virtually agree to the demands of the North mainly for the sake of unity which was absolutely 
necessary for the struggle for independence. Consequently, although the people were consulted, 
the needed national ideology, policies, structures and socialization were conspicuously absent and 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
Mediterranean Journal of  
Social Sciences 
Vol 8 No 4 
July 2017 
          
 23 
frustrated the attainment of a genuine document.  Invariably, the constitution that emerged was 
highly criticized by the people. While some people saw it as being essentially unitary, others 
regarded it as an ‘embryonic stage of federation'(Awa, 1964). On his part, Obafemi Awolowo (1960, 
p.179) saw it as "a wretched compromise between federalism and unitarism.” 
 
3.5 Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 
 
Realizing the difficulties involved in getting the regions to work together, considering the differences 
in development and other attributes, the colonial authorities decided to review the 1951 Constitution 
to make room for the greater autonomy of the regions. It followed, therefore, that the London 
Constitutional Conferences of July and August, 1953 were convened ostensibly to rationalize what 
had already been agreed upon by the colonial authorities. However, in spite of its positive 
attributes, it was obvious that the constitution was meant to protect the interest of the colonial 
authorities who capitalized on the rivalry and disunity among Nigerian nationalists to continue to 
perpetuate such interests. Moreover, it soon dawned on Nigerians that the imbalance in the 
structures of the federation which the constitution granted turned out to be a hindrance to national 
integration and cohesion. Here again, the ‘national’ spirit or consciousness which is vital in 
constitution-building as well as the attendant spirit of sacrifice were shoved aside. 
 
3.6 The Independence Constitution of 1960 
 
The making of the 1960 Independence Constitution still maintained this false tradition of 
constitution-building. Overwhelmed by the delusion of regional autonomy, the Nigerian nationalists 
were quick to ask for total freedom without first putting the ‘house’ in order. Yet again, the colonial 
authorities feigned sincerity by convening the 1957/58 London Constitutional Conference which, 
however, confronted Nigerians with the choice of either the creation of more states or 
independence, as if the two cannot go together. In spite of the participation of Nigerians in the 
preceding constitutional conferences and the granting of independence, the rudiments of the new 
constitution was a reflection of the feelings of the British government and so failed to satisfy the 
expectation of Nigerians. Like its predecessors, there was no attempt to efface the division of the 
country along tribal lines. Neither did it tackle the issue of minority fears, since the constitution 
excluded the much-desired provision for state creation which would have helped to correct the 
imbalance in the structure of the federation. Thus, as vividly captured by Olusanya (1980, p.543-4), 
 
… Nigeria entered upon her era of independence with a Constitution unsuitable for a country with 
such diverse group of peoples who had not yet attained full national unity. This fact and the weak 
leadership with which the country was saddled coupled with selfishness and lack of high moral 
standard of behaviour almost destroyed a country that was ushered into independence full of 
hopes and showered with goodwill. 
 
3.7 The Post-Independence Constitutions 
 
If the constitution-building aberrations during the colonial period are rationalized on the excuses, 
though flimsy, that the colonial authorities had to protect their political and economic interests or 
that the Nigerian nationalists were operating under hindering colonial fetters and had wanted to 
achieve total freedom first, the same cannot be said of the post-independence constitution-building 
and constitution-making arrangements. Though the post-independence indigenous political leaders 
fought vehemently against the ugly practice, they caved-in to the same ‘sin’ mainly as a result of the 
pressure of selfish and ethnic interests. The making of the 1963 Republican Constitution marked 
the first time Nigerians had the unfettered opportunity to make a constitution for the country and this 
was enacted through a law passed by the National Assembly of the country. However, apart from 
the endorsement of the republican status, the recognition of the Mid-Western Region and the 
enactment of the procedure for the creation of new regions or states, both the process and the 
constitution retained the vestiges of the 1960 Constitution. So, the usual tug of war among the 
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regions continued unabated, overheated the polity and ultimately led to the Civil War. 
The 1979 and 1999 Constitutions were produced under the influence of the military and did 
not also follow the conventional constitution-building process and culture. That of 1979 was, with 
some amendments, the direct outcome of the Constitution Drafting Committee set up by the military 
in preparation for transition to civil rule. It was intended to correct the mistakes of the past. More 
importantly, the act of soliciting submissions from the general public marked the beginning of the 
involvement of the ‘people’ in the process of constitution-building, as the report of the CDC formed 
the basis of a great debate after which the Constituent Assembly, though partly elected and partly 
appointed, re-scrutinized the draft before the final submission. The entire process was designed to 
ensure the overall acceptance and legitimacy of the constitution by the people. In other words, it 
was about the first indigenous attempt at constitution-making and constitution-building as it was, 
 
made in the light of the peculiar circumstances of Nigerian environment, tradition and culture, by 
Nigerians, for Nigerians, thereby justifying the preamble: ‘We the people of Nigeria … do hereby 
make, enact and give to ourselves the following Constitution’ (International IDEA, p.23). 
 
Regardless of its plausible attributes, the constitution was short-lived mainly due to inherent 
and implementation lapses. Its formulation was greatly influenced by the feelings of the military 
regime that midwifed it. Invariably, its implementation was saddled with the legacies of the 
authoritarian and arbitrary practices of the long years of military rule in the form of political 
repression, abuse of executive power, breakdown of the rule of law and generally weak and docile 
legislatures. 
The 1999 Constitution was a direct outcome of the Constitution Debate Co-ordinating 
Committee set up on the 11th of November, 1998 by the military regime in Nigeria and which 
allegedly reported that Nigerians were overwhelmingly in support of the reversion of the 1979 
Constitution. However, the way and manner the constitution was produced as well as the passive 
‘approval’ given by Nigerians, to a large extent, corroborated the fact that the constitution was a 
contingent arrangement to hurriedly midwife the transition to civil rule. Also, though the public 
debate that allegedly influenced the Committee’s report was evocative of the debate that preceded 
the promulgation of the 1979 Constitution, it was absolutely not as popular. Apart from revealing the 
alleged self-perpetuation manipulations of the military, these constitution-building aberrations point 
to the futility of the entire effort and the exigency of a review of the constitution. 
 
 Agitations for Constitutional Reform 4.
 
Continued pressure from Nigerians at different times led to the convening of national constitutional 
conferences that sought to find a lasting solution to the numerous grievances and opinions 
expressed by the component sections of the country concerning the need to review the ‘social 
contract’. Unfortunately, according to Agomuo (2014), both the 1994 Constitutional Conference put 
in place by the late General Sani Abacha and the National Conference under the Obasanjo 
administration in 2007 were unable to assuage such agitations. On March 17, 2014, the then 
President Goodluck Jonathan inaugurated another National Conference aimed at resolving issues 
relating to the structural defects of the country, national security, the devolution of powers and fiscal 
federalism, among other ‘viruses’ that have continued to threaten the unity and stability of the 
country. Ordinarily, this was a move in the right direction. Unfortunately, however, matured 
Nigerians welcomed the conference with genuine pessimism especially with regard to its 
composition and the attached pre-conditions, including the ‘no go areas’ which tended to restrict the 
participants to only the symptoms instead of the ailments. Agomuo (2014) observed that,  
 
The hall of the National Conference is filled with retired and tired men and women, some recycled 
over ten times in similar gatherings, ethnic jingoists who have been carrying on there as if the 
totality of the conference was on how to share national resources, retired military personnel and 
failed politicians whose actions and inactions aggregated to bring the country to the sorry state it is 
at the moment. With all these, it is doubtful if the conference will lead the country out of the woods. 
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Besides, there seemed to be a logjam between the National Conference and the National 
Assembly on the issue of statutory right to amend or review the constitution. The later, as the 
representatives of the people, set up an arrangement to amend the 1999 Constitution. As far as 
constitution-building is concerned, in view of the need to reinstate the sovereignty of the people, 
this was a move in the right direction because it widened the scope of the input from Nigerians to 
the review process. Equally commendable, towards this all-inclusive participatory stance, were the 
Peoples Public Sessions conducted by the House of Representatives in November 2012 (Daka, 
2014) and the transmission of the constitutional amendments to the constituent states of the 
federation by the National Assembly (Onochie, 2014 and Daka, 2014). The disgusting aspect of the 
situation was the attempt by the National Assembly to conclude the amendment process without 
the accommodation or consideration of the recommendations of the larger and more representative 
National Constitutional Conference instituted by the federal government as demanded by the 
people and which worked concurrently on the same nagging constitutional issues. There emerged 
allegations that the recalcitrant action of the National Assembly members was probably motivated 
by the need to cover up the self-serving provisions of their recommended constitutional 
amendments such as life pension for the principal officers of the National Assembly (Sunday 
Guardian Editorial, 2014). Regardless of the take-off flaws that confronted the National Conference, 
as earlier observed, the view of every Nigerian needed to be accommodated no matter how 
derisive such may sound, at least, for the sake of carrying every segment of and class in the 
country along. 
 
 Concluding Analysis: The Missing Links and the Way Forward 5.
 
It is rather puzzling that the country has experienced not less than nine constitutions but unable to 
sustain any. From the foregoing, a gamut of background problems that have been hindering the 
attainment of an enduring constitution-building culture over the years can be deduced. These 
include the influence of colonialism and its ‘divide and rule’ strategy that tended to favour one 
section against the others (Dudley, 1973, pp.58-9); politicization of ethnicity  (Nwabueze, 1994, 
p.133); the minority problems (Ojo, 1985); and bad leadership and corruption, among others. 
Specifically, there seems a be a wrong perception of constitution-building as a one-off 
episode, instead of a continuous process of political socialization and interest articulation and 
aggregation which culminates into constitutional reviews, ad infinitum. The logic here is premised 
on the dynamic nature of the human society. In view of the insatiability of human wants and the 
inevitability of frictions in human interactions, more so for multi-ethnic societies like Nigeria, 
constitution-building with its procedural and on-going bearing, just like democratization (Amaechi, 
2010), provides the enabling environment for the solving of present and future societal problems, 
without necessarily resorting to a new arrangement each time or to inter-ethnic conflicts. 
Besides, the necessary ideological and institutional frameworks for constitution-building are 
lacking in Nigeria, as the history of constitution-building in Nigeria is replete with contingent 
committees and arrangements. Moreover, there is the problem of political instability which 
engenders lack of continuity in governance and policies. Ordinarily, the attendant disruptions could 
not have been of much implication on constitution-building in the country but for the fact that each 
new regime, especially under the military, renders the existing constitution and its ideological basis 
impotent. All things being equal, the age of a constitution confers a good level of refinement or 
quality mark on it. In other words, the older the constitution-building experience, the better for the 
country. In this regard, the constitution of the United States of America remains a model. 
As a way forward, the establishment of a National Constitution-building Commission is 
expedient. It will be responsible for nation-wide consultations and other innovative techniques that 
would ensure a participatory Constitution-building ideology, culture and process. Secondly, 
constitution-making in Nigeria should be preceded by a National Dialogue on Constitutional 
Development or Sovereign National Conference whose outcome would be further re-examined by 
series of national consultative conferences. The process of consultation needs to be based on the 
agreement and idea that constitution development is an unending process that requires constant 
reviews and amendments. It is also necessary to adopt a number of principles and declarative 
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statements in order to guide the process and encourage the public to participate actively in order to 
influence the emergent constitution-building process and elements. So, unless there is a genuine 
attempt at redirecting the country to the real path of constitution-building, conflicting sectional 
interests and grievances will continue to metamorphose into identify conflicts. 
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